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Abstract 
  While acknowledging the importance of fairness and the need to avoid creating 
disincentives in the design of tax reform, the Henry Review recommends a simplified 
Personal Income Tax and child payments withdrawn on a single family income test. 
This paper shows that the proposed reforms would consolidate the existing family tax 
system, which clearly fails in terms of both fairness and disincentives. In the early 
1980’s Australia had a highly progressive individual income tax and universal family 
payments. Since then family income tests on child payments and tax cuts at high 
income levels have transformed the system into one of joint taxation with the highest 
marginal rates on low and average wage two-earner families. Under the Review’s 
recommendations the same families would continue to face the highest tax rates. Data 
presented indicate strong negative effects on productivity and the tax base due to 
disincentive effects on labour supply and saving over the life cycle. The paper 
proposes a return to a strongly progressive individual based income tax and universal 
family payments. 
 
JEL Codes:  D91, H21, H31, J13, J16, J22 






The Henry Tax Review
1 refers to the concept of horizontal equity and draws on the supposed 
cost-reducing advantages of targeting child payments, in support of the key elements in the 
future income tax and family payment system that it is proposing for Australia. The Review 
acknowledges the importance of taking considerations of fairness in the distribution of tax 
burdens into account, and of the need to avoid creating disincentives to labour force 
participation, while stressing also the importance of simplicity, transparency and coherence 
of the tax and child payment system. This paper examines the Review’s main 
recommendations for reforms of the Personal Income Tax and structure of child payments, 
using the available data and a realistic conceptual model of the household to assess their 
likely impact. The key changes considered are the recommendations for a simplified PIT 
scale and a “single family payment” per child to cover the “direct costs of children in a low-
income family (that is, the costs associated with food, clothing, housing, education 
expenses)”, together with the recommendation that the latter be withdrawn on a single income 
test defined on family income.
2 
 
It will be shown that the proposed reforms are a simplification and further extension of the 
existing system, which has been introduced incrementally across successive government 
Budgets during the last two and a half decades. In the early 1980s Australia had a highly 
progressive individual-based income tax and universal child payments. The family tax system 
now tends towards joint taxation with an inverted U-shaped rate scale, and therefore a system 
with very high rates on the incomes of married mothers as second earners. As argued in some 
detail in Apps and Rees (2010a), the “new” system is much less progressive in its distribution 
of tax burdens, has severe problems of horizontal inequity and imposes a high efficiency cost 
by inhibiting the growth of female labour supply and household saving over the life cycle. 
 
The shift towards joint taxation and the new rate scale has been achieved gradually through 
the less than transparent approach of switching from universal to family income-targeted 
                                                 
*This research was supported under Australian Research Council’s Discovery Project funding scheme 
(DP0881787). 
1 Australia’s Future Tax System Review Panel, Australia’s future tax system: Report to the Treasurer 
(December 2009) (AFTS Report). 
2 AFTS Report, Recommendations 90 and 96. 3 
 
child payments (now Family Tax Benefit Part A)
 3 combined with tax cuts at high income 
levels.  The argument used to support the Review’s recommendations for joint income-
targeted family payments is that universal payments are more “costly”.
4  However, reference 
to optimal tax theory shows that the idea of a cost saving achieved by targeting reflects a 
misunderstanding of the trade-off between efficiency and equity in tax design.
5  The true cost 
of the tax system (apart from its costs of administration and compliance) consists of the 
deadweight losses arising from the incentive effects of the marginal rate scale on family work 
and saving, given the distribution of tax burdens, or average tax rates, it imposes. I argue in 
this paper that the move to targeting child payments on joint income has worsened the 
performance of the Australian tax system along both these dimensions.     
 
I present data on time use, consumption and saving, organised according to a “family” life 
cycle model, to support the argument that family income-tested child payments are 
unnecessarily costly in terms of deadweight losses. By organising the data according to 
family phases defined on the presence and age of children, rather than on age of “head” of 
household as is usual in the literature, the very large fall in female labour supply in the early 
child-rearing years, and the life cycle persistence of labour supply decisions at that time, 
becomes evident.  Moreover, among families with similar demographic characteristics and 
earnings possibilities there is a high degree of heterogeneity – some households decide that 
the female partner, as “second” earner, will withdraw entirely from the workforce to provide 
child care at home, while in others she remains in full time work and buys in child care. The 
data also indicate that household saving at average earnings levels is strongly positively 
associated with the labour supply of the second earner.  
 
On the basis of this evidence I propose a return to a strongly progressive individual-based 
income tax and universal family payments, for reasons of fairness as well as economic 
growth.  Given the evidence that female labour supply among couples of prime working age 
                                                 
3 1983 saw the first step in the process, with the introduction of the “Family Income Supplement” withdrawn on 
joint income, which has since evolved into Family Tax Benefit Part A excluding the base rate.  A series of 
subsequent reforms have completely eliminated universality. 
4 For example, the AFTS Report (Pt 2, Vol 2, p 557) states that “...it would be extremely costly to provide 
universal payments.  Phasing out payments using a low withdrawal rate can provide some level of assistance to 
most families without the full cost of a universal payment”.  
5 For a detailed exposition of the error in the logic of the “cost” saving argument, see Apps and Rees (2010a) 
and Rees (2010). 4 
 
is only around 50% of that of their male partners, I suggest that the gains in terms of the 
increase in the tax base and GDP would be well above previous estimates. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents a comparative analysis of the 2009-10 
income tax and child payment system and the Review’s recommendations.  Section 3 
presents and interprets the data on time use and saving.  A concluding comment is contained 
in Section 4.   
 
 
2  Income taxation and family payments 
 
The Review recommends a simple three-bracket Personal Income Tax (PIT) rate scale that 
incorporates the Low Income Tax Offset (LITO) and Medicare Levy (ML). The first part of 
this section compares the Review’s scale with the 2009-10 scale applying to individual 
incomes under the PIT and LITO. The ML is omitted because it is based partly on joint 
income (due to the withdrawal of the “reduction amount” on family income) and therefore 
cannot be included in a rate scale that applies to individual incomes. The section goes on to 
describe the rate structure of the overall 2009-10 family tax system incorporating the ML and 
Family Tax Benefits, and provides examples of how it would change if the Review’s 
recommended reforms to the Personal Income Tax and family payments for the direct costs 
of children were introduced.  
 
 2.1  Review’s rate scale vs. 2009-10 rate scale 
 
The 2009-10 Personal Income Tax scale is strictly progressive and simple. There are just five 
marginal rates, 0, 15, 30, 38, and 45 cents in the dollar, with the zero rate applying to incomes 
from $0-$6,000 and the top rate of 45 cents in the dollar to incomes above $180,000.  
However, the formal PIT rates are not the true or “effective” rates that apply to individual 
incomes.  The true rate scale is obtained by adding the LITO.  The result is shown in Table 
2.1.  The LITO increases the zero rated threshold and simultaneously raises the PIT rates by 
four cents in the dollar over the range from $30,000 to $63,750.  The Australian individual-
based income tax is no longer strictly progressive.  The LITO is in fact an entirely redundant 
policy instrument that has served only to reduce the transparency of the rate increase across 
the “middle” of the distribution.   5 
 
 
The Review argues for a simplified rate scale that has a “high tax-free threshold with a 
constant marginal rate for most people […]”.
6   The recommended scale is shown in Table 
2.2.  Note that the middle rate of 35 cents in the dollar on incomes from $25,000 to $180,000 
is just one cent higher than the current 34 cent rate on incomes from $35,001-$63,750 or, if 
the 1.5 cents ML rate is added across this band of income, just half a cent lower.   
 
Table 2.1  2009-10 MTR scale 
Taxable Income $pa PIT + LITO ($1,350)
$0-15,000 
$15,001 - $30,000 
$30,001 - $35,000 
$35,001 - $63,750 
$63,751 - $80,000 










      Table 2.2  MTR scale recommended by Review   
Taxable Income $pa Review
$0 - $25,000






The Review notes that: 
A progressive income tax is characterised by average rates that rise with income, ... 
Progressivity can be achieved either through a flat tax rate with a tax free threshold, 
a rising personal income tax rate scale, or a combination of both.
7 
 
However, the relevant concern is not so much how progressivity is achieved but, all other 
things equal, the degree of progressivity. Figure 2.1(a) compares the 2009-10 marginal tax 
rate (MTR) scale with that proposed by the Review, with respect to primary income. Figure 
2.1(b) compares the resulting average tax rate (ATR) profiles. The Review obviously offers 
the more simple scale but, as the figure makes clear, some income groups win and others 
lose.  
 
The increase in the zero-rated threshold clearly makes a group of very low income earners 
better off.  Individuals on taxable incomes from $15,000 to $33,125 are better off. This is 
shown in Table 2.3, which reports ATRs at selected income levels.  Above $33,125 the ATR 
of the Review’s scale is higher than that of the 2009-10 scale and remains above it up to 
                                                 
6 AFTS Report, Recommendation 2. 
7 AFTS Report, Pt 2, Vol 1, p 13. 6 
 
$127,667.  At $72,700 the ATR of the Review’s scale is 1.5% above the 2009-10 scale. If the 
ML rate of 1.5 cents in the dollar is included, the individual would break even at this point, 
but would lose thereafter until reaching an income of just above $85,100.  Beyond this point 
all gain even with the ML included in the 2009-10 scale.    
(a) MTRs (b) ATRs
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             Table 2.3  ATRs of  2009-10 and Review tax scales  


















Ongoing changes in the PIT scale and expansion of the LITO can be shown to have resulted 
in a significant shift in the tax burden towards the middle range of incomes. The incremental 
shift achieved in each successive government Budget, when considered in isolation, appears 
so small as to be unimportant, and the same assessment might be made of the Review’s 
recommended scale on the basis of the preceding analysis. However, when seen as part of a 
cumulative process, the overall shift in the tax burden towards the middle has been 
substantial.   
 7 
 
To show this, Figure 2.2 compares the ATR profiles of the PIT+LITO rate scales for the 
years 2007-08, 2008-09, 2010-11, and the “aspirational” rate scale and LITO for 2013-14. 
The unequal downward shifts in the ATR profile in each successive year indicates the role 
played by the LITO and PIT rate scale changes in shifting a disproportionate share of the tax 
burden towards middle income earners. In effect, individuals on average earnings have been 
denied an equi-proportional rate of compensation for the failure to index tax bands, as shown 
by the far smaller vertical gap between the ATR profiles for each year across taxable incomes 
from around $60,000 to $90,000 per year.  
 
    Figure 2.2  ATRs: PIT+LITO 2007-08, 2008-09, 2010-11 & 2013-14     
  
 
Overall, the Review’s scale may be close to revenue neutral with respect to the 2009-10 PIT 
scale and LITO.  However, if the ML is included in the calculation, the Review’s scale, as a 
stand-alone reform, would very likely lose revenue. The significance of the Personal Income 
Tax as the centrepiece of the Australia’s tax system would be diminished. Given the strong 
emphasis the Review places on the efficiency merits of an indirect tax at a constant rate on all 
consumption expenditure, including food, the proposed rate scale would appear to be part of a 
package that involves a tax-mix change, from income to consumption taxation.  However the 
argument that indirect taxation is more efficient than direct taxation draws on models that 
treat the family as a single person and therefore fail to define the tax base as joint 
consumption. The base for indirect taxation is inevitably some measure of joint consumption 
because, unlike individual earnings, the consumption of family members cannot be observed. 
It is therefore a more constrained policy instrument than an individual income tax, and can be 
expected to have disincentive effects on family labour supply and saving that are similar to 
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2.2  Income tax rate scale and family payments 
 
Because child payments vary with the number and age of dependent children, marginal and 
average tax rates at given income levels will vary accordingly. For the purpose of exposition I 
present results for two demographic groups:  
 
•  Two-child family: one child under five and the other under 12.  
•  Three-child family: children aged from 13 to 15 years. 
 
The relevant 2009-10 Family Tax Benefits for these groups are: 
 
FTB-A: 
Maximum rate for each child:  $4,803.40 pa for a child under 13 years and $6,033.45 pa for a 
child aged 13 to 15 years, withdrawn at 20 cents in the dollar at a family income threshold of 
$44,165 down to the base rate. 
Base rate for each child: $2,018.45 pa withdrawn at 30 cents in the dollar at a family income 
threshold of $94,316 plus $3,796 for each additional child after the first. 
 
FTB-B:  
Maximum rate for family: $3,828.85 pa if the youngest child is under 5 years or $2,774 pa if 
the youngest child is aged from 5 to 15 years, withdrawn at 20 cents in the dollar on a second 
income above $4,672.  Families where the primary earner has an adjusted taxable income of 
more than $150,000 are not eligible. 
 
The ML, which also varies with demographics, is included.  The 2009-10 family income 
threshold for the full ML reductions for a two-parent family is $31,196 plus $2,865 for each 
dependent child.  An additional 8.5 cents in the dollar applies to income above this limit until 
the reduction is entirely withdrawn.
8 
 
My analysis of the Review’s recommendations for family payments focuses on the following: 
 Recommendation 90: 
Current family payments, including Family Tax Benefit A and B, should be replaced by a 
single family payment.  The new family payment should: 
(a) cover the direct costs of children in a low-income family (that is, the costs associated 
with food, clothing, housing, education expenses); and 
(b) assist parents nurturing young children to balance work and family responsibilities. 
 
Recommendation 91: 
The direct cost of children component of family assistance should be a per child payment. 
                                                 
8 This raises the MTR across bands of taxable family income by 10 cents in the dollar. For example, a single-
income family with two dependent children faces a MTR of 44 cents in the dollar on income from $36,927 to 
$43,442.  9 
 
(a) Rates of payment should increase with the age of the children to recognise the higher 
costs of older children.  Three rates of payment should apply: for 0-11 year olds; 12-
15 year olds; and 16-18 year olds while in secondary school. 
 
Recommendation 96: 
The total amount of family assistance should be withdrawn with a single means test to avoid 
cumulative withdrawal rates which create unnecessarily high disincentives for working.  A 
single low taper rate of 15-20 per cent would be appropriate to minimise work disincentives.  
 
The Review does not specify the size of family payments or the family income threshold at 
which they would begin to be withdrawn.  It does however provide the following “estimates 
of the cost of children based on the cost of children research” from “FaHCSIA modelling”:
9  
 






The payments for the 5-11 and 12-15 bands are the same as those for 2009-10 FTB-A for a 
child under 13 and from 13-15 respectively. In the analysis to follow these figures are used 
for child payments, and the lower family income limit is set at $44,165, the 2009-10 
threshold, for withdrawal of the payments. The withdrawal rate is set at 20 cents in the dollar.   
 
The aim of the analysis is to identify the basic structure of tax rates implied by the above 
recommendations, and in particular the recommendation to replace FTB-A with a single 
family payment withdrawn on a single means test defined on family income. The focus of the 
analysis is on “in-work” families, and especially those with a primary earner on low to 
average earnings. I do not include elements of the welfare system.  As explained in Section 
3.3, family payments are a policy response to market failures that differ fundamentally from 
those that give rise to the need for unemployment and disability benefits, and they are 
therefore associated with very different information and moral hazard problems. 
 
To help families “nurturing young children to balance work and family responsibilities” the 
Review recommends the following supplements for the “direct costs of children”:
10 
A supplement for parents nurturing young children (aged under six years) should be provided 
as a per-family payment, means tested on family income…For couples with children aged six 
                                                 
9 AFTS Report, Pt 2, Vol 2, p 568. 
10 AFTS Report, Pt 2, Vol 2, p 577. 10 
 
or older, a parental supplement at the same rate as for single parents should be paid through 
the income support system.
11 
 
Given the conditions specified, the supplement proposed for a family with a child aged six or 
older appears to be set at approximately the full FTB-B payment for a child over five, while 
that for a family with a child under six, at a considerably higher level than the current FTB-B 
payment for a child under five.  However the Review also proposes combining Child Care 
Benefit and the Child Care Rebate into a single payment based on 35% of child care costs, 
rather than the current 50%, and so a significant component of the higher supplement for the 
child under six may represent an offset for the reduction in the child care payment for the 
second earner. The two recommendations need, therefore, to be examined together.  For this 
reason I do not include these supplements in the analysis, other than to point out the effects of 
including the net gain they might provide on the direction of the results.   
 
Under joint taxation the tax rates of partners are interdependent. This means that the marginal 
and average tax rates faced by a family member will vary with their partner’s earnings as well 
as their own income.  To capture the effects of this I take the case of a family in which the 
male partner, as primary earner, works full time in the market and the female partner can 
allocate her time to untaxed work at home or to taxed market work, and I show what happens 
when the female partner changes her employment status. In other words, I show how tax rates 
change when the family switches “type” by changing the labour supply of the female partner 
as second earner.  There are therefore the two household types: 
 
•   Type SE:   A single-earner household in which the male works full time in the 
market and the female works full time at home; 
•   Type FT:   A two-earner household in which both partners work full time in the 
market and earn the same incomes. 
 
For reasons of simplicity, I assume that non-labour incomes are zero and that there is no 
gender wage gap.  The latter implies that both partners earn the same income for full time 
market work.   
 
Two-child family: 2009-10 system  
Figure 2.3(a) compares the MTRs faced by the SE and FT households as primary income 
rises.  The profiles of MTRs indicate the overall tendency towards an inverted U-shaped 
                                                 
11 AFTS Report, Pt 2, Vol 2, Recommendations 92 and 94. 11 
 
profile of marginal tax rates for both family types, due to the withdrawal of FTBs.  The 
strong shift towards joint taxation, also introduced by the FTB system, is captured by the gap 
between the MTR profiles, with the FT MTR profile substantially to the left of the SE profile. 
This is a characteristic feature of joint taxation: both earners in a two-earner household face a 
higher MTR at a given level of individual earnings than the single earner, because their 
higher total earnings put them in a higher tax bracket. Under an individual income tax, both 
partners face the same MTR at the same given level of individual earnings, and so the MTR 
profiles of the two household types coincide. Note, however, that under individual taxation 
the FT household still pays twice as much tax as the SE household because the female partner 
has chosen to work in taxed market work rather than in untaxed household production. 
(a) MTRs (b) ATRs
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Figure 2.3(b) plots the resulting ATR profiles of the two household types, and includes the 
ATR profile of the female as second earner in the FT household, labelled ATR2.  The figure 
shows how the FTB system increases the tax burden on the two-earner household by 
imposing a higher ATR on the increment in the household’s income resulting from the 
second partner going out to work. This is higher than the ATR on the primary earner’s 
income when she does not go out to work, because of the effect her income has in raising the 
marginal tax rate they both face. The higher effective ATR on her income then raises the 
overall ATR on joint income of the two-earner household, labelled ATR FT in the figure.  12 
 
Under joint taxation the FT household now pays more than twice as much tax as the SE 
household. 
  
Two-child family: the Review’s recommendations  
Because the current system has been introduced in a gradual, piecemeal way through the use 
of very indirect policy instruments, rather than explicitly as a new inverted U-shaped rate 
scale with a shift in the tax base from individual to joint income, it has very irregular MTR 
profiles, as Figure 2.3(a) illustrates. This sometimes leads to the view that the system is an 
accident.  This is a mistake. The successive changes have resulted in a structure of average 
rates that has been carefully planned. The same ATR structure is supported by the Review’s 
recommendations. Their main effect is to “tidy up” the MTR profile, as the following 
diagrams illustrate.  
 
Figure 2.4(a) plots the MTR profiles for the two household types when the HTR tax scale is 
combined with family payments withdrawn on a single family income test.  Although the 
MTR profiles are now far simpler and neater, the basic rate structure is unchanged – both 
MTR scales exhibit an inverted U-shaped profile with respect to primary earnings, with the 
FT profile far to the left of the SE profile over the range $25,000 - $50,000.  The highest 
MTR of 55 cents in the dollar applies across a wide band of middle income SE households,  
(a) MTRs (b) ATRs
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and across a lower and narrower band of earnings in the case of the FT household. Figure 
2.4(b) shows the resulting ATR profiles. 
 
Figure 2.5 combines the ATR profiles in Figures 2.3(b) and 2.4(b) for each household type. 
The ATR for the two-earner FT household is almost unchanged because the Review’s system 
continues to impose high effective average tax rates on increments in household income due 
to the second earnings, as in the existing system. Adding the supplement for the family with a 
child under six, net of a significant reduction in the child care payment, would have the effect 
of reducing the ATR at lower income levels but of raising it further along the distribution. 
The ATRs for the SE household are above those under the 2009-10 tax system, but the 
differences could be expected to be reversed by the large “nurturing” supplement for the child 
under six.  Overall, the results suggest that the Review’s recommendations would more 
firmly establish the basic structure of the existing system.   
 
                      Figure 2.5 ATRs: SE and FT households 
                                 
 
 
Three-child family: 2009-10 system and the Review’s recommendations 
 
Figures 2.6(a) and 2.6(b) compare MTRs for the SE and FT household with three children 
aged from 13 to 15 years. Figures 2.6(c) compares the ATRs of the two household types.  
Given that the supplements for the direct costs of children, net of a reduction in the child care 
payment for the “in-work” family, appear to be related to payments under FTB-B, the 
following analysis omits FTB-B. The aim is to make a more direct comparison between FTB-
A and the Review’s single payment withdrawn on a single family income test. The results in 
Figure 2.6 show that, even though the MTR profiles differ dramatically, the ATR profiles are 
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Figure 2.6  3-child family: MTRs and ATRs 
 


















0 50000 100000 150000



















0 50000 100000 150000



















0 50000 100000 150000
Primary income, dollars pa
ATR SE 2009-10 ATR FT 2009-10
ATR SE KHR ATR FT KHR




2.3  Impact of 2009-10 family tax system on “in-work” families 
 
Table 2.4 reports the distribution of tax burdens across “in-work” families ranked by quintiles 
of “primary income”, defined as the private income of the higher income partner, under the 
2009-10 family tax system. The analysis is based on data for a sample of families drawn from 
the ABS 2007-08 Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) on the criterion that at least one 
dependent child is present. Given the focus of the analysis on “in-work” families, the sample 
is also selected on the criteria that combined private income is greater than $15,000 per 
annum, neither partner is unemployed or a full-time student, and neither partner reports a 
negative private income. All income figures are indexed to 2009-10 dollars. 15 
 
 
The first panel of the Table shows what would happen if all second earners withdrew from 
work. The ATRs are those that would apply to primary earnings and non-labour incomes if 
second earnings were zero.  The “lost revenue” is the tax paid on the increment in household 
income due to the second partner working in the market.  At an average of $7110 it represents 
almost 40% of total income tax revenue collected from working families. This is an 
especially high figure given that secondary earner hours are less that 50% of primary hours, 
and average second earnings are only 30% of average primary earnings. 
 
Table 2.4  Tax burdens by primary income, 2009-10 $pa 
Quintiles of primary income  30386 49122 64534 82842 172722  All 
SE Taxes if zero 2
nd earnings         
Net tax $pa  -9149 -1092 5969 13248 45135  10822 
Lost revenue $pa  3577 5894 6806 9588 9685  7110 
ATR %  -30.1 -2.2 9.2 16.0 26.1  13.3 
PT         
Second earnings $pa  12808 18385 19466 22110 26046  19763 
Tax on second earnings $a  4576 6106 5885 7095 9588  6650 
ATR2 %  35.7 33.2 30.2 32.1 36.8  33.6 
FT         
Second earnings $pa  17055 27744 36761 49224 50486  36985 
Tax on second earnings $pa  6106 9006 11652 16649 15809  11844 
ATR2 %  35.8 32.5 31.7 33.8 31.3  32.0 
 
 
The second panel of the table reports the data means of taxes paid by two-earner families 
with the second earner in part-time work (PT) and the third panel, with a second earner in full 
time work (FT).  The distribution of ATRs reflects the very high marginal rates on the second 
income at low and average levels of primary income, as would be expected from the 
preceding diagrammatic analysis.  
 
ATRs on the second income at the levels indicated mean that, on average, married mothers 
who go out to work lose around a third of their income in taxes and reduced FTBs.  They also 
contribute more to GST revenue because their additional income is spent at least partly on 
goods and services subject to GST, and bought as substitutes for those that can be produced 
by working full time at home. The evidence on life cycle labour supply presented in the 
section to follow indicates that the decision to withdraw from the workforce in the early child 
rearing phases has strong persistence effects over the remainder of the working age phases of 16 
 
the life cycle.
12 Thus the introduction of a less distortionary tax system could be expected to 
increase not only the labour supply of those who currently have dependent children but also 
that of working age households in which dependent children are no longer present.   
 
3  Labour supply, saving and household welfare 
 
Evaluation of the effects of changes in a tax system on tax revenues, aggregate taxable 
incomes and individual wellbeing requires modelling the behavioural responses economic 
agents make to these changes, in particular as they relate to labour supplies, consumption and 
saving. In this section I present the empirical evidence which underlies the modelling 
approach I use to evaluate the Review’s proposals. The data lead to the conclusion that the 
type of tax system resulting from these proposals, as well as being excessively costly in 
achieving its desired income redistribution, which in any case is quite inequitable, would 
actually reduce household saving, and therefore risk undermining macroeconomic policy 
objectives of high investment and growth.      
 
3.1  Time use and the family life cycle   
 
The available evidence on wage elasticities indicates that the labour supply of prime age 
males is much less responsive to changes in the net wage than that of females in the same age 
category. However, a serious limitation of much of the literature on labour supply is that it 
assumes that the adult members of a household have only two uses of their time, market 
labour supply and leisure, and so ignores the existence of household production and intra-
family exchange of domestic for market output.
13 This cannot be excused on the grounds of 
data availability, since a large body of data on intra-household time use now exists, and a 
large and growing literature is concerned with analysing it.
14  
 
Time use data reveal two important facts. First, they show that the allocation of time to 
household production, especially by the female partner, is a very significant form of time use, 
above all when young children are present in the household, and that there is a high degree of 
                                                 
12 See Apps and Rees (2009) and (2010a), and Labour supply, saving and household welfare, Life cycle time use 
below. 
13 The household is, in fact, a small economy, with taxes on trade between households but not on trade within 
the household. For a formal model, see Apps and Rees (1999). 
14 See for example, Gronau and Hamermesh (2006) 17 
 
substitution between market work and work at home, especially child care. It is this 
substitution which drives the observed much higher labour supply elasticities of women 
relative to men. Second, the data reveal a high degree of heterogeneity in the time use 
allocations of the female partner, as the second earner, across households with similar 
demographic profiles and wage rates.  The conventional model is entirely inadequate to deal 
with this because, in effect, there is a missing price variable – the price of child care.  More 
generally, the models need to be extended to include a child care production function that 
captures the substitution between home and market child care.
15     
 
Time use data also indicate that, as pointed out earlier, labour supply decisions in the child-
rearing phase tend to persist after the children leave home, for a not insignificant proportion 
of families. It is therefore important to evaluate the effects of proposed reforms to family 
payments within a life cycle approach.  However, again, the mainstream literature is seriously 
limited for this purpose. The convention is not only to assume (at best) a simple work-leisure 
choice, but to treat the household as a single person whose life cycle is defined on the age of 
“head” of household.  It is essential to take a “family” life cycle approach in order to identify 
the relationship between family policies and household labour supply and saving decisions.   
 
A further crucial implication of introducing household production is that total family income, 
with or without an equivalence scale adjustment, and household consumption are no longer 
reliable measures of family living standards, or of household welfare. This is most obvious in 
the case of families with pre-school children.  Two young families can have the same joint 
income but very different wage rates, if in one family the income is earned by one partner 
and, in the other, by both partners. For these families to be equally well off, it would have to 
be the case that the value of child care produced by full time work at home in the first 
household is less than that produced in the second household with a much lower parental time 
input. This requires implausibly large differences in home child care productivity and/or a 
much lower price of bought-in child care.   
 
This section supports the foregoing assertions by presenting life cycle profiles of the time 
use, consumption and saving behaviour of couples, drawing primarily on data for couple 
income units selected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2005-06 Time Use 
                                                 
15 For a formal model, see Apps and Rees (2009, 2010b) . 18 
 
Survey (TUS) and the ABS 2003-04 Household Expenditure Survey (HES).  The TUS 
provides detailed information collected by diary on the allocation of time to labour market 
activities and nine non-market activities.
16 The non-market activities are aggregated into three 
categories: domestic work, child care and leisure.
17  Total time allocated to domestic work 
and child care is labelled as "household production" and the sum of time allocations to all 
other activities as "leisure". These time use data are merged with the information for each 
record in the selected HES sample, which includes all couple income units apart from those 
in which a partner is a full time student or reports a negative private income.
18 
 
The data are organised according to a “family” life cycle consisting of five phases: 
    •   Phase 1: the couple are of child-bearing age but do not yet have children; 
    •   Phase 2: there is at least one child aged under 5 years in the household; 
    •   Phase 3: the still-dependent children are all aged over 5 years; 
    •   Phase 4: the couple are of pre-retirement age with no dependent children present; 
    •   Phase 5: the couple are of retirement age. 
 
The sample is partitioned into these phases on the following criteria. Phase 1 contains couples 
with no dependent children present and a female partner aged from 20 to 39 years. In phase 2 
there is at least one child under 5 present, and in phase 3 there is at least one dependent child 
but none under 5 years.  Phase 4 includes couples in which the male partner is under 60 years 
and there are no dependent children present.  In phase 5 the male partner is aged 60 or over 
and there are no dependent children present. The number of records in the full sample is 
3,963, and in phases 1 to 5: 389, 726, 1044, 747 and 1057, respectively. All income figures 
are indexed to 2009-10 dollars. 
 
3.2  Life cycle time use 
 
The pivotal relationship between female labour supply and the demand for child care 
becomes evident when time use data are organised according to the above family phases. 
Table 3.1 reports data means for the allocation of time to market work, domestic work and 
child care across the phases, and Figures 3.1a to 3.1c present the results graphically for each 
time use, including annual leisure hours.    
                                                 
16 The activity categories are: personal care, education, domestic activities, child care, purchasing goods and 
services, voluntary work and care, social and community interaction, active recreation and passive leisure. 
17 Domestic work includes the activity episodes classified as "domestic activities" and "purchasing goods and 
services". 
18 For further detail, see Apps and Rees (2010a). 19 
 
 
Table 3.1     Life cycle time use, hours per annum 
   Male  hours     Female  hours  
Phase  Market Domestic  Child  care  Market Domestic  Child  care 
1  2213 718  -  1882 928  - 
2  2127 815 1008 764 1654  2521 
3  2103 816  355 1158  1840 807 
4  1803  934  - 1078  1761 - 




Figure 3.1     Life cycle time use, hours pa 
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In phase 1 the time allocations of partners are closely matching. On average both work above 
full time annual hours (calculated on the basis of 35 hours per week).  They spend a minimal 
amount of time on household production, as would be expected since there are no children 
present and both partners have had similar educational opportunities and work histories, and 
therefore have close to the same wage rates. When the family enters phase 2 female labour 
supply falls by over 50%.  This fall is more than matched by a rise in the allocation of time to 
household production, around 80% of which is child care. Because there are no children 20 
 
under five in the household in phase 3, child care hours fall to a small fraction of their phase 
2 level. Domestic hours rise only marginally, and similarly in phase 4.  Nevertheless, average 
female labour supply remains well below its phase 1 level for the remainder of the life cycle. 
There is relatively little change in average male hours during the working age phases. While 
the decline in phase 4 is significant, it in no way matches the drop in female hours in the 
younger phase 2 age category.  The overall result is a large gender gap in hours. 
 
Studies that organise the data by age of head diffuse the dramatic fall in female labour supply 
in phase 2 by combining couples in phase 1 with those in phases 2 in the younger age of 
“head” categories. The result is a female profile that tends to replicate the male profile at a 
lower level of hours. This may in part account for the acceptance of the single-person model 
as a harmless simplification. However, the model can lead to a misinterpretation of the data. 
For example, Erosa and Gervais (2002, p 340) using a life cycle model based on a within-
period single-person work-leisure choice decision, base their conclusions for tax policy on 
the assumption that "consumption and leisure [measured as non-market time] generally move 
together over time". The data in fact show that the rise in female non-market time in phase 2 




3.3  Life cycle income, consumption and saving    
 
Defining the life cycle on family phases also gives a very different picture of family 
consumption and saving decisions.  Much of the standard literature generates “hump” shape 
profiles of both income and consumption, but this is a misreading of the data due to 
averaging across young couples in phases 1 and 2.
20 As shown in Table 3.2, the usual single 
"hump" shaped profile of median net income
21 is missing,
22 despite the moderating effect of 
                                                 
19 The Erosa and Gervais analysis has had a strong influence on the discussion of tax reform. See for example, 
Banks and Diamond (2008). 
20 This is referred to as the “excess sensitivity puzzle” and has generated a vast literature offering a range of 
explanations, one of the most widely accepted being the “buffer stock” model. See, for example, Carroll (1997) 
and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).  
21 Net income is the sum of labour and non-labour incomes, net of taxes and government cash transfers. 
22 As for example in Attanasio and Browning (1995), Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994), Deaton (1991) 
and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). 21 
 
direct taxes and benefits, because household income strongly tracks female labour supply and 
is therefore at its lowest level in phase 2.
23  
 












children   
1  98602  42400 79836 27978 110390 - 
2  74836  7844  67767 95071 80791 95600 
3  91137  24989 77484 59172 88084 64068 
4  89082  27560 74339 42241 111043 - 
5  22229  0  36367 46966 86774 - 
*Medians 
 
When the family’s opportunity cost of time spent on household production (“hhp”) and their 
spending on market consumption are added together, and the full costs of children are 
subtracted, a U-shaped profile of adult consumption across the life cycle is obtained, shown 
in the column “Adult mkt+hhp”.
24  This finding is consistent with the U-shaped leisure 
profiles in Figure 3.1c.  The result is driven by the very high cost of children to parents in 
phase 2, measured correctly to include parental time costs.
25 It is concluded from these 
findings that the average family is not using the capital market to smooth consumption. In 
Apps and Rees (2010b) we calibrate a model to show that the life cycle profiles of parents’ 
consumptions and leisures are consistent with a capital market in which the borrowing rate is 
significantly above the lending rate for the average family. In the presence of this kind of 
capital market failure, child payments are a necessary policy correction.
26 They are not a 
response to the kinds of insurance market failures that create the need for unemployment or 
disability benefits.  The associated moral hazard and information problems of the latter differ 
fundamentally.  
 
Table 3.3 presents the family life cycle profile of median saving, calculated as the difference 
between net income and consumption expenditure.  Saving is at its highest level in phase 1, 
                                                 
23 The income figures are based on the 2007-08 SIH data and the consumptions figures on 2003-04 HES data, 
both indexed to 2009-10 dollars. 
24 The opportunity cost of time is evaluated at the respective partner’s net wage. For further detail, see Apps and 
Rees (2010b). 
25 These child costs are consistent with the results in Apps and Rees (2001). When indirect government benefits 
are included, the cost of a school aged child is closer to that of a child under 5 due to the much higher level 
government investment in the education of the school child.  
26 Child payments, in common with education benefits, are also a correction for agency problems that arise in an 
economy in which a child draws heavily on family income for access to funds for investment in their human 
capital.  For further discussion of this point, see Apps and Rees (2001).   
 22 
 
then falls to its lowest level in phase 2 and thereafter rises until the retirement phase, but does 
not return to its phase 1 level. The results indicate that saving, as well as household income, 
strongly tracks female labour supply.  
 














price ratio % 
1  11107  -1373  1186 11477 64.8 49.0 
2  2839  -4524  1679 9648 70.4 34.9 
3  4618  -3494  2035 7721 83.3 20.3 
4  8049  3432  3477 4694 87.3 8.9 
5  1560  1123  1129 454 90.3 1.1 
    . *Medians.  **Weighted data means 
 
 The calculation of saving as the difference between net income and consumption expenditure 
gives, in effect, the household's long term saving. The data indicate that many households 
are, in fact, borrowing short term to meet various forms of long term contractual saving, such 
as mortgage payments on housing loans and mandatory contributions to superannuation.  The 
second column of Table 3.2 lists the median short term saving in each phase, obtained by 
subtracting total spending from net income. While median long term saving is positive in 
each phase, short term saving is negative in phases 1 to 3: the median household in these 
phases is in the position of having to borrow short term to finance long term saving. 
 
Table 3.3 also lists average contributions to superannuation and life insurance, average 
mortgage payments, the percentage of households who are home owners or purchasers, and 
the average debt to house price ratio. The strong incentive to save for house purchase is 
reflected in the decline in the housing debt to house price ratio from 49% in phase 1 to 1.1% 
in phase 5, a decline that follows a rise in the percentage of home owners, from 64.8% in 
phase 1 to 90.3% in phase 5. It is straightforward to show that the user cost of owner 
occupied housing, obtained by discounting payments of capital and the initial equity at the 
time of purchase, approaches zero and may become negative over time. This clearly creates a 




                                                 
27 The data suggest that home ownership is analogous to an annuity with a high rate of return, due importantly to 
low transactions costs if households rarely move house over the life cycle. Preferential tax treatment is a 
contributing factor but cannot alone explain the user cost differential between owning and renting over time if 
one assumes, implausibly, a perfect capital market. 23 
 
3.4  Time use heterogeneity 
 
The preceding life cycle time use profiles based on data means conceal the high degree of 
heterogeneity in female labour supply, which is evident from gender differences in 
employment status.  Table 3.4 reports the distribution of female employment status within 
each of phases 1 to 4. As above, “FT” refers to full-time employment and "PT" to part-time 
employment. "NE" denotes not in employment.   
         Table 3.4      Employment status by gender 
 
Phase 
                          Males                                                        Females 
FT PT    NE FT  PT    NE 
1  90.4  5.9  3.7 76.3 17.2 6.5 
2  85.8  7.8  6.4 19.9 36.6 43.5 
3  84.7  6.3  9.0 33.0 40.4 26.6 
4  70.1  8.8  21.1 33.1 30.6 36.2 
5  14.8  6.8  78.4 6.2 6.9 86.9 
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The histograms in Figure 3.2 show graphically the significant heterogeneity in female 
employment that emerges in phase 2 and continues until the retirement phase. Full time 
female employment falls from 76.3% in phase 1 to 19.9% in phase 2, and stays below 33% in 
subsequent working age phases. Over 26 per cent remain out of employment in phase 3 and 
over 36 per cent in phase 4. These figures indicate a high degree of persistence of decisions 24 
 
made in the child rearing phases.
28 In contrast, male employment is around 85 per cent until 
the pre-retirement phase, where it drops to 70.1 per cent. 
 
Time use data show that married women employed full time within each of phases 2 to 3 
allocate considerably less time to domestic work and child care than those employed part 
time or not in employment. To illustrate, Table 3.5 reports phase 2 data means for female 
hours of market work, domestic work and child care, by employment status.  On average, 
those employed FT work a total of 5227 hours in the market and at home, and those in PT 
employment, work a total of 5094 hours per year. The average for those not employed is only 
fractionally lower, at 4786 hour per year. 
  
Table 3.5  Female time use and demographics (phase 2) 
Female 
employment 
Female hours pa Deps<  
5 years 
# 
deps  Market  Domestic   Child care 
FT  2110  1276 1841 1.20 1.71
PT  959  1602 2533 1.26 1.94
NE  0  1893 2893 1.37 2.12
 
 
These diverse time use choices cannot be explained adequately by demographics because 
there is little variation in the average numbers of dependent children, as well as the numbers 
aged under five, with employment status. There is also little variation in predicted gross wage 
rates in the early phases. More significant differences emerge later in the life cycle, as would 
be expected, given the evidence in the literature on the loss of human capital associated with 
an extended period of withdrawal from the labour market.  It is therefore inferred from these 
data that many families with the same demographic characteristics and earnings possibilities 
are making very different time use decisions during the earlier phases of the life cycle.   
 
As argued in Apps and Rees (2010b), the family tax system can be expected to contribute 
significantly to the degree of heterogeneity.  The effective rate structure described in Section 
2 defines a non-convex piecewise linear tax system. Two households can therefore be equally 
well off at either high or low hours, and so small differences in characteristics can be 
transformed into a large difference in labour supply.  
 
 
                                                 
28 This is consistent with the results of US panel data studies (see, for example, Shaw, 1994). 25 
 
3.5  Heterogeneity, household income and welfare ranking errors 
 
If families with the same wage rates and demographic characteristics were observed to make 
the same time allocation decisions, then, all else being equal, it could reasonably be expected 
that a strong correlation would be found between household income and family welfare 
within a demographic group. Under these conditions, joint taxation would not necessarily be 
unfair in terms of the distribution of tax burdens across households. It would, of course, 
widen the net-of-tax gender wage gap and could therefore be expected to disadvantage 
women in general by widening inequality within the family. However, it would not 
discriminate against two-earner households because, at given wage rates, all would be the 
same type. 
 
In this section, I investigate the limitations of household income as a welfare indicator using 
the 2007-08 SIH sample of “in-work” families described in Section 2.3.  Since the female 
partner has the higher earnings in a non-trivial proportion of households, the analysis is based 
on the income status of partners, “primary” vs. “secondary” as defined previously, rather than 
on gender. 
 
The degree of re-ranking is due not only to heterogeneity in second earners' labour supplies, 
but also to the shape of the distribution of primary income. To show this, I rank households 
by quintiles of primary income and then split the records in each quintile into two household 
of types: 
 
    Type H1: The second earner is working at or below median second earner hours; 
    Type H2: The second earner is working above median second earner hours. 
     
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3 present the profiles of hours and incomes of these two types, by 
quintiles of primary income. An important feature of the results is the relatively flat profile of 
primary income up to the 5th quintile, at which point it more than doubles. The increase is 
due almost entirely to an increase in the primary earner's wage, since average hours increase 
by less than 10%. In a distribution of primary income of this shape, the position of a family in 
a ranking defined on household income will be very sensitive to the labour supply of the 
second earner, because it will take only a small increase in her earnings to shift the family to 




  Table 3.6       Labour supplies and incomes by primary income (phases 2 and 3) 
Primary income quintiles  30386 49122 64534 82842  172722 
(a) Labour supplies        
H1: Primary market hours pa   1928 2167 2245 2307 2521 
       Second market hours pa  124  312 407 377 389 
H2: Primary market hours pa  1903 2136 2273 2292 2403 
       Second market hours pa  1696 1920 1921 1915 1993 
(b) Incomes          
H1: Primary income $pa  29645 49138 63980 83073  185463 
       Second income $pa  5627 10158 13166 14920  21793 
H2: Primary income $pa  31188 49106 65124 82643  158012 
       Second income $pa  19740 30686 35914 45520  53729 
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Table 3.7 presents a quintile ranking by household income. The two household types tend to 
be reordered towards opposite ends of the distribution. The percentage of H2 households in 
quintile 1 falls to 29% and rises to 62% in phase 5, respectively. The data means for primary 
income give an indication of the extent to which a household income ranking places two-




                                                 
29 The re-ranking could be justified on the basis of the assumption that the single earner has married a low wage 
partner, but this assumption is rejected by the evidence on assortative matching. 27 
 
       Table 3.7  Household type by household income (phases 2 and 3) 
Household income quintiles  37954 64868 87425 116101  218322 
H1 %  71 58 49 39 38 
Primary income $pa  34650 57333 72296 94862  215591 
# Dependent children under 5  2.09 1.94 2.04 2.00 2.07 
H2  %  29 42 51 61 62 
Primary income $pa  29115 43791 57734 74989  138332 
# Dependent children under 5  1.76 1.70 1.80 1.84 1.88 
 
The upper income limit of quintile 1 is $53,292, and the lower limit of quintile 4, $98,002. A 
single-earner family with an income of $50,000 will be located in quintile 1.  If the family 
switches “type”, with the second partner working full time for the same income, the family 
will be re-ranked from quintile 1 to quintile 4. If the household has a preschool child, much 
of the second net income may be spent on child care. Clearly, such a household cannot be 
said to have the same standard of living as another in which only one parent needs to work 
full time to earn $100,000 while the other works full time at home.  
 
Table 3.8 presents quintile data means for time use, which show that the second earner's shift 
to market work tracks a large fall in the allocation of time to household production, and 
especially to child care, within each quintile of primary income. The Table also reports the 
average number of children under five in each quintile. There is little variation in this across 
household types, especially in the lower quintiles. Thus, to justify the omission of household 
production from measures of household welfare it is necessary to assume either that bought-
in child care is costless or that home child care makes little to no contribution to the welfare 
of the H1 household. 
 
Table 3.8     Second earner time use by primary income (phase 2) 
Primary income quintiles  1 2 3 4 5 
H1  Child care hours  2797 2902 2812 2950 2941 
        Domestic hours  1823 1866 1879 1845 1867 
        # Children under 5  1.28 1.37 1.28 1.49 1.46 
H2  Child care hours  2209 2225 2030 2195 2095 
        Domestic hours  1410 1440 1403 1454 1400 
        # Children under 5  1.26 1.25 1.06 1.26 1.18 
 
 
3.6  Saving and labour supply  
 
Studies that model the household as a single person with a life cycle defined on the age of 
household head do not provide the appropriate insights into the relationship between 28 
 
household saving and labour supply. While it is recognised that the absolute amount of 
saving rises with the labour market participation of the female partner as second earner, the 
saving rate, measured as the ratio of saving to household income, is typically found to fall 
with an increase in female labour supply. Consequently, the overall saving rates of economies 
that have experienced significant increases in female labour supply since the 1960s have been 
observed to fall (see, for example, Attanasio and Banks, 1998). There is also the mistaken 
perception that it is very predominantly “the rich” who save.   
 
The problem is that household income as conventionally measured omits home production.  
As time use data show, an increase in female market hours is closely matched by a fall in 
home production hours.  To give a truer picture, the saving rate needs be calculated with 
respect to a measure of household income that includes implicit income from home 
production, since then the effects of the switch from domestic to market work would be more 
accurately picked up.  
 
As I have already shown, a ranking by household income places two-earner households with 
primary earners on relatively low-to-average wages in the upper percentiles of the 
distribution. The result is that the saving behaviour of two-earner households is 
misrepresented. Much of the saving in the economy is that of average-wage two-earner 
families in the middle of the distribution of primary earnings. I show this by comparing the 
distribution of savings with respect to primary income (Table 3.9a) and household income 
(Table 3.9b) based on regression estimates that control for the number and age of children 
and for the income ranking variable, primary and household income respectively.  The data 
sample includes all records in phases 2 to 4.  
 
The first row of Table 3.9a gives the predicted levels of household saving that would result if 
second earners withdrew from the workforce, that is, if all households became type SE. The 
following panels give the predicted levels of saving by household types, H1 and H2 (defined 
according to median hours of work of the second earner as above) and the earnings associated 
with the second earner’s hours of market work.  
 
When households are ranked by primary income it can be seen that the level of saving 
depends very heavily on the contribution made by the second earner across the middle 
quintiles of the distribution. The results indicate that if all second earners were to withdraw 29 
 
from the workforce after the arrival of children, their annual earnings up to retirement would 
fall by over 25% (sample data means for primary and second earnings are $64,006 and 
$21,842, respectively).  Household saving would fall by over 75%, from an average of 
$7,325 per year to $1,575 per year.    
 
The ranking by household income in Table 3.9b gives a different picture.  The first row of the 
Table reports the level of saving by quintiles of household income, and shows that saving 
rises quite steeply with household income. The second two rows report the saving levels of 
the H1 and H2 household types.  It can be observed that within each quintile, saving (and 
therefore the saving rate) falls.  The very large addition to saving across the middle of the 
distribution of primary earnings due to the second earner is not immediately obvious, even 
though it is clear that the overall level of saving in the economy rises. 
 
  Table 3.9a      Long term saving and 2
nd earnings by primary income, $pa (phases 2 to 4)  
Primary income quintiles  1 2 3 4 5  All 
SE:  Saving if zero 2
nd earnings   -12306 -6506 -1514 3194 26514  1575 
H1:  Saving $pa  -11900 -4649 358 5921 29344  3423 
         2
nd earnings $pa  2005 7812 9323 12815 12912  11227 
H2:  Long term saving  -8196 1608 8005 15878 39068  9681 
         2
nd  earnings $pa  12051 27028 32832 42773 47266  32457 
 
  Table 3.9b      Long term saving by household income, $pa (phases 2 to 4)  
Household income quintiles  1 2 3 4 5  All 
All:  Saving $pa   -12223 -3866 3282 11509 37850  7325 
H1:  Saving $pa  -12209 -3821 3381 11664 38103  3427 
H2:  Saving $pa  -12268 -3941 3191 11428  37733     9681 
 
 
These results suggest that the labour supply effects of high effective tax rates on the second 
earner may have a very significant negative effect of saving, far more so than a tax on saving 
directly or a tax on capital income.  Female labour is arguably the most mobile factor of 
production in the economy, because of its high degree of substitutability with household 
production, especially child care in the early phases of the life cycle. OECD countries with 
family tax and child support systems that do not discriminate as heavily against the second 
earner have far higher female labour supplies, for example in the order of 50% higher in the 
case of Sweden.  The preceding analysis suggests that the same countries also will tend to 
have higher levels of saving (as opposed to saving rates) and greater taxing capacity for the 
purpose of public investment in child care and education as a result of their larger tax base.    30 
 
 
4       Conclusions 
 
I have shown in this paper that the Review proposes a consolidation and extension of the 
changes that have over the last few decades made the Australian family tax system less fair 
and more costly in the true economic sense – in terms of the efficiency costs created by the 
incentives to work and save that it presents. The Review’s proposals on marginal tax rates 
represent simply a tidying up of the messy structure that was the legacy of the piecemeal and 
opaque way in which this reconstruction of the tax system was made. The Review preserves 
essentially the same structure of average tax rates. It perpetuates the fallacy that targeting 
child payments saves costs, while remaining silent about the fact that basing the withdrawal 
rates on joint income contradicts its rhetoric on the incentives for labour force participation. 
Reducing the relative contributions of direct as opposed to indirect taxation (for example, if 
in addition to the introduction of the Review’s recommended income tax changes,  the GST 
base were widened by taxing food) worsens the effects on labour supply, by shifting the tax 
burden to working families. Finally, the Review does not appear to appreciate the effects that 
high effective tax rates on average wage families and second earners have on saving and 
therefore long term investment and growth. The Review leaves the Australian tax system still 
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